Legal Rights and Legal Duties
The powers raise another question. Many authors (e.g. Hohfeld 1919, Hart 1973) have considered it a kind of right. By legal force, we mean the ability to make changes to the law or its application (as well as other conditions). As a general rule, of course, when granting a power, the legislature also grants the right to exercise it, but this is sometimes not the case, for example if the exercise of the right itself would constitute a felony or tort. In English law, for example, until a recent change in the law, a thief had the legal authority, in certain special circumstances, to transfer ownership of stolen property to a third party, even if he had committed a civil and possibly criminal fault. This seems to indicate that powers should not be considered rights themselves. ➢ Primary law and secondary law: The primary duty is an independent duty and is an absolute duty, independent of other duties, while the secondary duty is a duty that is not independent of other duties and results from a breach of an obligation. ➢ Legal title: Title is the process of transferring or transferring rights to a person. These are certain events to which the former owners have received their rights, such as purchases, gifts or wills. In French law, the distinction is made by distinguishing between objective law (the name with a capital letter after some writers, but not all) and subjective rights. (For a general discussion, see for example Cornu 2014.) At the same time, however, French law seems to limit the notion of “subjective rights” to a subcategory of rights, namely rights that are mainly those of individuals, for example: the drafting of a will or a contract.
The term does not appear to extend to rights such as those of a government agency that owns property or a minister adopting a legal system under delegated authority. All legal issues and practices revolve around the rights and obligations of individuals and authorities. Despite the existence of moral rights, all rights are legal in our time. According to Salmond, all legal rights include the following: Dworkin (1973, 1975, 1981, 1986) was a proponent of the first point of view in a formulation of his legal theory. Consequently, rights have a categorical primacy over any other consideration that is not itself legally justified. Of course, it is true in many legal systems that constitutional rights, or some of them, should take precedence over any other consideration that does not itself flow from a constitutional right. But this seems to be mainly due to the constitutional status of the law. Both in law and morality, many rights are rather trivial.
In morality, these rights can sometimes even be justified by considerations of personal comfort (cf. Raz 1978). Similarly, it appears in the legislation that many prima facie rights can be overridden by what the court considers to be public interest considerations. Dworkin`s (1977) response to the latter type of criticism was to argue that, on closer inspection, the examination of opposition to the law can itself be seen as instantiating another common law. However, this depends on the controversial assertion that the only considerations on which the courts can legitimately rely are pre-existing rights. It was also objected that, as a general theory of the nature of rights, it might be self-destructive, since then any consideration could be considered to be based on law, which meant that rights did not have a particular role in practical argumentation. (For a discussion of Dworkin`s theory, including its other formulations, see Yowell 2007.) Although Mills does not necessarily share the view that all rights are linked to the foundations of well-being, many contemporary authors (p. e.g., Raz 1984a, 1984b; Wellman 1985, 1995) agree that the basic concept of a law is something common to law and morality, although some have argued that legal authors, particularly Hohfeld, provide a better and clearer starting point for general analysis than previous authors in moral philosophy. The view that the basic concept is common to both seems consistent with the assertion that legal claims concerning justification in practical reasoning should nevertheless be based on moral claims. In the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has held that “statutory rights in the strict sense are equivalent to statutory obligations and statutory rights are defined as those interests which the law protects by imposing obligations on other persons.